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ABSTRACT 
 
Going public is an important decision in the life of a company. Most companies that decide to 
go public do so via an initial public offering (IPO). Earlier studies have revealed that IPOs are 
prone to be underpriced, in that the share prices experience a substantial jump in the first trad-
ing day. Another established anomaly concerning initial public offerings is their long-run poor 
performance. In addition to IPO related literature, the role of a firm-specific risk is very impor-
tant regarding this study. Previous studies document a significant increase in firm-specific vola-
tility of stock returns over the past two decades. This increase has been documented to be even 
more dramatic for newly listed firms. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects of post-IPO firm-specific volatility level 
and volatility change on IPO-underpricing and post-IPO performance, cross-sectionally for new 
public companies in Finland. Three research questions are raised to address the focus of the 
study. First, what is the trend of post-IPO firm-specific volatility behavior? Second, how are the 
post-IPO return volatility levels and changes in return volatility related to the IPO underpric-
ing? Third, how is the long-run post-IPO performance related to return volatility level and 
change?  
 
A negative association was found between the initial firm-specific volatility level and the post-
IPO volatility change. The empirical evidence in this study indicates a strong association be-
tween high initial firm specific volatility and underpricing. The long-run performance evalua-
tion reveals that the initial low volatility firms seem to outperform the high volatility firms in 
the first 240 trading days. Furthermore, low and increasing volatility firms are far better per-
formers than the low and decreasing volatility firms. 
 
KEYWORDS: IPO, firm-specific risk, underpricing, long-run performance 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
 
Going public is an important decision in the life of a company. It gives access to 
public equity capital and so may reduce the cost of funding the operations and 
investments of the company. It also provides a market place for the existing 
shareholders to diversify their investments, which is an important attribute for 
venture capitalists. In addition to the direct benefits, the act of going public it-
self may bring numerous indirect benefits, for example attracting different cali-
ber managers and getting positive advertisement for the company. Regardless 
the great potential of getting listed, it also has numerous direct and indirect dis-
advantages, such as administrative expenses and the loss of privacy, which may 
be crucial to their competitive advantage. (Ljungqvist 2007) 
 
Most companies that decide to go public do so via an initial public offering 
(IPO). IPOs have been a widely researched topic over many decades. Early stu-
dies of Logue (1973) and Ibbotson (1975), reported that IPOs are prone to be 
underpriced, in that the share prices experience a substantial jump in the first 
trading day. Since the 1960’s, when the IPO research began, this underpricing 
anomaly phenomenon has averaged around 19 % in the United States, indicat-
ing that the issuing companies are leaving a significant amount of money on the 
table. Bonds, for instance, are hardly ever mispriced more than a few basis 
points, whereas the price jump from the offer price of an IPO to its first day 
closing price can be over hundred percent. Thus, a considerable amount of 
money is at risk, when companies go public. This considerable empirical regu-
larity of underpricing has motivated an extensive theoretical literature and fur-
ther has inspired to rationalize why IPOs are underpriced. (Ritter & Welch: 
2002) 
 
Another established anomaly concerning initial public offerings is their long-
run poor performance. Ritter (1991) found that excess returns of IPOs do not 
cumulate after the first day of trading. He demonstrates that IPOs underper-
form significantly compared to a matching firm portfolio. International evi-
dence also confirms the existence of long-run underperformance. However, ef-
ficient market proponents, especially Fama, argue that the anomaly does not 
exist. Fama (1998) claims that abnormal returns often disappear with some rea-
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sonable changes in the methodology, therefore it can hardly be called an ano-
maly.  
 
In addition to IPO related literature, the role of a firm-specific risk is very im-
portant regarding this study. Previous studies document a significant increase 
in firm-specific volatility of stock returns over the past two decades. This in-
crease has been documented to be even more dramatic for newly listed firms. 
Although the presence of the firm-specific risk had been noticed and that it ac-
counts for the major part of the total risk, its relation to IPO anomalies remained 
unexplored.  It was not until 2009, when Beneda and Zhang did a novel study, 
in which they investigated how different initial firm specific volatility levels 
and the subsequent aftermarket firm-specific volatility changes affect on the 
previously mentioned two IPO anomalies.  
 
Although, as already stated, the underpricing and the long-run underperfor-
mance have been well-explored, yet the Finnish evidence is somewhat limited 
to Keloharju’s (1993) study. Data used in his study is from 1984-1989, so the re-
sults might not be relevant anymore. Indeed, the results in Keloharju's paper 
are quite far from the results that are obtained from more recent studies in other 
countries. This paper provides two main contributions to previous literature. 
First, more recent data are used; the sample period consists of 68 IPOs listed in 
Helsinki stock exchange between 1994 and 2006. Second, this paper adapts Be-
neda and Zhang’s novel methodology, in which both initial volatility levels and 
changes are investigated cross-sectionally. More importantly, what is their as-
sociation to underpricing and performance in the long-run? 
 
From a practical point of view, this paper discusses whether there is a lucrative 
investment strategy considering IPOs. According to the numerous previous 
studies, there is mispricing involved considering IPOs. When anomaly is de-
tected, a superior trading strategy could be, in theory, created or even arbitrage 
opportunities could be at hand. It is quite clear at this stage that on average, 
IPOs are very worthwhile investments for their subscribers, but the more rele-
vant issue is how to pursue after the first day of trading?  
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1.1 Purpose of the study 
 
This paper examines the heterogeneity of both levels and changes in the after-
market IPO stock return volatility and their associations to IPO-underpricing 
and post-IPO performance. To address the focus of the thesis, three questions 
will be raised. First, what is the trend of post-IPO firm-specific volatility beha-
vior? After an IPO, the firm-specific risk can either increase, decrease or remain 
stable. This paper tries to find a relation, if there is any, between the initial vola-
tility levels and post-IPO volatility change. The behavior of IPO stock returns 
volatilities are examined cross-sectionally. In addition to the examination of 
firm-specific risk, also the change in systematic risk is explored. However, the 
main focus is on the firm-specific risk considering its notable proportion to total 
risk. Second, how are the post-IPO return volatility levels and changes in return 
volatility related to the IPO underpricing? Third, how is the long-run post-IPO 
performance related to return volatility level and change?  
 
These relationships are important given the significant information implication 
contained in the firm-specific risk. The firm-specific risk reflects a higher degree 
of heterogeneity in investors belief, hence it conveys a higher ‚firm-specific risk 
information‛. On the one hand, information asymmetry argument predicts a 
negative relationship between underpricing/performance and firm-specific risk. 
On the other hand, a positive relationship between underpricing and firm-
specific would be expected, if underpricing compensates investors for acquiring 
costly information. Moreover, the paper does not only examine the risk level, 
but also to the risk evolution.  (Beneda & Zhang 2009) 
 
In general, the purpose of this study is to investigate if a small sample of Fin-
nish IPOs have similar characteristics to Beneda and Zhang’s larger sample 
from U.S markets.  A thin security market as Finland, it is likely to have some 
interesting features. The small number of IPOs naturally limits the scope of the 
research. But at the same time, these special characteristics of Finnish stock 
market, makes it interesting to analyze the empirical findings. 
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1.2 Structure of the study  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as following. Next section (2) discusses the 
initial public offerings in general. The motivations to go public as well as the 
advantages and disadvantages are presented. The discussion in this section 
ends to a brief demonstration of how the actual listing process is conducted. 
Third section concentrates on the most meaningful previous literature regard-
ing this study. This literature consists of studies that have investigated the un-
derpricing and the long-run underpricing issues. In addition to those IPO re-
lated anomalies, this section discusses the significant role of firm-specific risk. 
In fourth section the data and the methodology used in this paper are described 
in detail, whereas the fifth section provides the empirical results of this study. 
The last section offers the concluding remarks. 
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2. INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS 
 
 
When firms need to raise new capital to fund their operations and investments 
they may sell or float securities. These new issues of stocks, bonds, or other se-
curities are typically marketed to the public by investment bankers in what is 
called primary market. Transactions of already-issued securities happen in sec-
ondary market. Trading in the secondary market does not change the securities 
outstanding, only the ownership changes. (Bodie, Kane & Marcus 2008:57) 
 
Primary offerings can be sold either in a private placement or in a public offering. 
In a case of private placement, the firm (using an investment banker) sells 
shares to a small group of investors. Private placements are cheaper than public 
offerings, but are less suitable for larger offerings. Additionally, private place-
ments do not trade in the secondary market. This causes liquidity problems and 
reduces the price to be paid for the issue. (Bodie, Kane & Marcus 2008:58-59) 
 
There are two types of primary market issues of common stock, which are ini-
tial public offerings (IPOs) and seasoned new issues. IPOs are stocks issued by a 
formerly privately owned firm that is selling stock to the public for the first 
time. Seasoned new issues are offered by companies, who have already gone 
public, and are in need for new capital. This section concentrates solely on ini-
tial public offerings. (Bodie, Kane & Marcus 2008:58-59) 
 
Going public is a substantial change in a company’s life cycle. It is a long 
process that takes a lot of time and requires harmonious co-operation between 
various parties. This section discusses the motives and both benefits and disad-
vantages for a company’s decision in going public. The process of going public 
will also be discussed. 
 
2.1 The purpose of going public 
 
There can be numerous reasons for going public, which can serve different kind 
of purposes. Usually, going public becomes relevant when a company wants to 
grow and/or expand the ownership. Pagano, Panetti and Zingales (1998) argue 
that the decision to go public is one of the most important and yet least studied 
questions in corporate finance. They state that the majority of corporate finance 
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textbooks are limited to describing the institutional aspects of this decision and 
providing little information on its motivation.  
 
The general opinion is that going public is simply a stage in growth of a com-
pany. Pagano, Panetti and Zingales however, point out that this is not neces-
sarily the case, as even in developed capital markets such as the United States, 
some large companies are not publicly traded. Moreover, other countries, such 
as Germany and Italy, publicly traded companies are exceptions rather than the 
rule.  According to their paper, these cross-sectional and cross-country differ-
ence indicate that going public is not a stage of a company’s life cycle, but ra-
ther it is a choice. This raises the question of why some companies choose to go 
public and some do not? The decision to go public depends on various factors. 
Benefits can be seen as the driving force and costs can be seen as the counter-
force. 
 
2.1.1 Benefits of going public 
 
Access to alternative source of capital  
 
Overcoming the borrowing constraints by gaining an access to a new source of 
capital other than banks is probably the most well-known benefit of going pub-
lic. The possibility to raise funds from public markets is most attractive for 
companies with large current and future investments. High leverage and high 
growth companies are also likely to seek new capital with a public offering. 
Going public also gives the company a chance to gain more capital by conse-
quent offerings. (Pagano, Panetti and Zingales 1998) 
 
Bargaining power with banks  
 
Going public improves the company’s ability to borrow money.  According to 
Rajan (1992), by gaining access to stock market and disseminating information 
to the generality of investors, a company elicits outside competition to its lender 
and ensures a lower cost of credit, a larger supply of external finance, or both. 
This leads to a prediction that companies facing higher interest rates and more 
concentrated credit sources are more likely to go public. After the offering, the 
company becomes less leveraged and thus credit will become cheaper and more 
easily available. (Pagono, Panetti and Zingales 1998) 
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Liquidity and portfolio diversification 
 
Owners of a private company may have a hard time selling their holdings. For 
selling shares, the owner has to find a counterpart through informal searching, 
which can be time consuming and expensive. Selling shares of a publicly traded 
company is easy and cheap. Especially small investors, who want to sell on 
short notice, will benefit from the new situation. Liquidity is far better for pub-
licly traded companies, but depends on the trading volume. (Pagano, Panetti 
and Zingales 1998)  
 
The decision to go public affects the opportunities to diversify for the initial 
owners of the company. If diversification is a significant motive for going pub-
lic, it can be expected that riskier companies are more likely to go public and the 
initial owners of the company will sell a large amount of shares at the time of 
IPO or soon after it. (Pagano, Panetti and Zingales 1998) 
 
Monitoring 
 
Publicly traded companies are out in the open for everyone to see and assess. 
Therefore, stock market provides a managerial discipline device by creating the 
danger of takeovers and by giving other market participants an opportunity to 
assess the managerial decisions. Firstly, if a company’s management is working 
insufficiently, an outside source can take over the company and fire the man-
agement. Secondly, managerial choices are assessed by the market and are con-
sequently shown in changes of stock prices. Stock price can work as an instru-
ment for managerial incentives and a basis for their compensation e.g. salaries 
indexed to the stock price and stock options (Holmström & Tirole 1993). (Paga-
no, Panetti and Zingales 1998)  
 
Investor recognition  
 
Merton (1987) stated that stock prices are higher the greater the number of in-
vestors aware of the particular security. Investors are prone to ignore that a cer-
tain company exists and they hold only a fraction of existing securities in their 
portfolio. Getting listed might help to overcome this obstacle, by acting as an 
advertisement for the company. (Pagano, Panetti and Zingales 1998) 
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Stock exchange releases, interim and annual reports guarantee that updated 
information about the company is available. This has a positive all-around ef-
fect to the company. It generates interest and trust towards the company’s 
products and service and attracts capable personnel to come forward and work 
for the company. Getting listed in a foreign market enhances the company’s 
credibility as a future business partner. It is easier to start a business relation 
with a company that is well-known rather than with an unknown company. 
(Pagano, Panetti and Zingales 1998) 
 
Change of control  
 
According to Zingales (1995a), initial owners planning to eventually sell the 
company want to maximize the value by going public. Initial shareholders 
might have been financing the company for a long time without a reasonable 
yield. Going public gives them an opportunity to get the proper compensation 
for their work/investment. Especially, small shareholders find it a lot easier to 
sell and more importantly, sell for a value that reflects the company’s real val-
ue. The ultimate goal for venture capitalists is to get listed, cash out and find a 
new lucrative investment opportunity, so going public serves the purpose per-
fectly. (Zingales 1995a; Sabine 1987: 41-44; Eskelinen & Räsänen 1995:10-11; Pri-
cewaterhouseCoopers 2003) 
 
In many cases the change of control happens inside the family. Change of gen-
eration is a lot easier when the company is publicly traded. As stated earlier, 
going public increases the liquidity of the stock and therefore makes the process 
easier, if some of the inheritors want to leave the family business. The share 
price is usually higher for listed companies than unlisted companies. This is 
because there is more information available for publicly traded companies than 
private companies. Information increases the demand and the value of the 
company. (Eskelinen & Räsänen 1995)  
 
Windows of opportunity  
 
Ritter (1991) suggests that there are periods, in which stocks are mispriced.  
Companies recognizing this ‚window of opportunity‛ that other companies in 
their industry are overvalued have an incentive to go public. Ritter found that 
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there are concentrations in volume of IPOs that are associated with taking ad-
vantage of a window of opportunity.  
 
Evidence exists in several markets that issuers take successful advantage of a 
window of opportunity to lower the cost of capital. For example, Kim and Stulz 
(1988) presents evidence that issuers take advantage of difference in borrowing 
costs that periodically arise between the domestic and Eurobond markets. Fur-
thermore, Lee, Schleifer and Thaler (1991) present evidence that closed-end 
funds are issued more often in periods when discounts are smaller than usual.  
 
2.1.2 Disadvantages of going public  
 
Regardless the great advantages that going public has to offer, numerous dis-
advantages have also been documented. Previous literature consisting of Lel-
and and Pyle (1977), Rock (1986), Pagano, Panetti and Zingales (1998), Sabine 
(1987:43-44), Ritter (1998), Ibbotson, Sindelar & Ritter (1988:37), Fuerst, Geiger, 
Peres, Gilo and Lubash (2002:219-220) and Eskelinen & Räsänen (1995) found 
the following disadvantages of going public. 
 
Adverse selection 
 
Investors are less informed about the true value of the company going public 
than the issuers. Investors do not know the true value of the company and this 
information asymmetry adversely affects the average quality of the companies 
seeking a new listing and therefore at which price their shares will be sold and 
also determines the magnitude of the underpricing needed to sell them. The 
cost of this adverse selection is more serious for young and small companies. 
They usually have little track record and low visibility compared to older and 
bigger companies going public. 
  
Administrative expenses and fees 
 
Going public is very expensive and risky. Each of the three major parties (issu-
er, investor and investment bank) face risk, therefore initial public offerings are 
often fairly risky. Besides leaving money on the table in the form of initial un-
derpricing, going public contains certain costs associated to the need to provide 
information about the company to investors and regulators. There are consider-
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able direct costs consisting of underwriting fees, legal fees etc. There are also 
yearly layouts on auditing, certification, and dissemination of accounting in-
formation, stock exchange fees etc. On top of the direct costs of going public are 
also indirect costs, which include for example the time and effort spent for con-
ducting the IPO.  
 
Loss of privacy 
 
Public companies are forced to disclose a great deal of information about its 
business.  Secrecy of these pieces of information may be crucial for their com-
petitive advantage, such as data about ongoing research and development 
projects or future marketing strategies. 
 
Going public also means fewer chances to ‚avoid‛ taxes compared to private 
companies. Additionally, public companies are in general far more exposed to 
legal suits than private companies. Loss of privacy might not be the only thing 
the initial owners lose within IPO. They might lose the control of the firm, but 
that is something that should be expected. 
 
Problems caused by new owners 
 
Getting listed means that management needs to serve the shareholders’ 
interests. It gets harder to sell long-term business ideas, which reduces short-
term performance. This is usually because shareholders and other practitioners 
monitoring the company are mainly interested in the next quarter’s numbers. 
Reduction of operational flexibility becomes evident after getting listed. To do 
business efficiently, decisions may need to be done quickly. The need to stop 
and ask the approval from shareholders, could mean a lost opportunity in a fast 
paced business enviroment. Dividend policy brings also certain limitations to 
the table. Once the policy is chosen, shareholders are usually not willing to 
change it, because any changes affect the share price.  
 
2.2 Listing process 
 
Going public is a process which takes a lot of time and careful preparation. 
Numerous important matters have to be considered to make the listing process 
successful and at the same time keep all parties satisfied and committed to the 
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task. Furthermore, going public, exposes the company to new challenges, new 
obligations and a variety of new uncertainty factors. Successful listing requires, 
in addition to favorable market condition, that the market has trust towards the 
listing company and the lead underwriter. On top of the requirements for the 
exchange, companies getting listed have to take into consideration post-listing 
obligations regarding public relations and insider information. (Pricewaterhou-
secoopers 2003; Brau and Fawcett 2006) 
 
Preparations before listing are usually related to the decision to go public and 
organization of different parties. The board of directors starts the listing process 
together with the owners and manages the listing preparations. According to 
Hiden (2002), the process requires that certain variables are considered, such as, 
the company’s financial position, the needs of the initial owners and other poss-
ible sources of finance. After the decision to go public is set, a project organiza-
tion is established, which includes the lead underwriter or syndicate, legal ad-
visors, accountants and marketing advisors. The planning and execution of get-
ting listed involves the participation and co-operation of all three parties. The 
initial owners also have an important role in determining the terms and condi-
tions of the offering (Eskelinen and Räsänen 1995: 29). (Pricewaterhousecoopers 
2003)   
 
Once the lead underwriter is chosen, they and the listing company negotiate 
with the stock exchange about the terms and schedule of getting listed. The 
terms regarding the company’s operational and financial status have to be met 
in order to go public.  The vast majority of the listing requirements are harmo-
nized between NASDAQ OMX Helsinki, NASDAQ OMX Stockholm, NASDAQ 
OMX Copenhagen and NASDAQ OMX Iceland. However, some differences can 
be observed regarding national legislation or other differences in the regulatory 
framework in a specific jurisdiction. The general requirements are summarized 
as follows: 
 
Incorporation 
Validity 
Negotiability 
Whole class to be listed 
Annual financial reports and operating history  
Profitability and working capital 
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Liquidity 
Market value of shares 
Suitability 
 
Incorporation: the company must be duly incorporated or otherwise validly es-
tablished according to the relevant laws of its place of incorporation or estab-
lishment. 
Validity: the shares of the issue must conform with the laws of the company’s 
place of corporation, and have the necessary statutory or other consents. 
Negotiability: The shares must be freely negotiable. 
Whole class to be listed: The application for listing must cover all issued shares 
of the same class. 
Annual financial reports and operating history: the company and its consolidated 
group of companies shall have prepared and disclosed annual financial reports 
for at least three years in accordance of with accounting laws applicable to the 
company and its consolidated group of companies. In addition, the line of busi-
ness and the field operating of the company and its consolidated group of com-
panies shall have a sufficient operating history.  
Profitability and Working Capital: the company shall demonstrate that it possesses 
documented earnings capacity on a business group level. A company that does 
not possess documented earnings capacity shall demonstrate that it has suffi-
cient working capital available for its planned business for at least twelve 
months after the first day of listing. Briefly, this means that the company has to 
be able to prove that it is profitable. 
Liquidity: Conditions for sufficient demand and supply shall exist in order to 
facilitate a reliable price formation process. A sufficient number of shares shall 
be distributed to the public. In addition, the company shall have a sufficient 
number of shareholders. a sufficient number of shares shall be considered as 
being distributed to the public when 25 percent of the shares within the same 
class are in public hands. 
Market value of shares: The expected aggregate market value of the shares shall 
be at least 1 million euro.  
Suitability: The Exchange may also, in cases where all Listing requirements are 
fulfilled, refuse an application for listing if it considers that the listing would be 
or is detrimental for the securities market or investors’ interests.  (NASDAQ 
OMX)  
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Often when preparing an offering, a thorough investigation about financial and 
legal state is needed, so called due diligence (Ritter 1998). Analysis of the finan-
cial state is important when going public. In the case that returns have not been 
favorable in the near past, it will presumably reduce investors’ trust and have 
an effect on the IPOs success. Therefore, during the preparation period, the lead 
underwriter tries to evaluate the company’s strengths and weaknesses in order 
to analyze how it is positioned compared to other companies in the field. 
 
An underwriting agreement shows the tasks and liabilities of the lead under-
writer. The task of underwriting is to share the risk of the offering, though the 
role of underwriting can be determined in several ways. Most common roles are 
firm-commitment contract and best-efforts contract. In firm commitment contract 
the underwriter subscribes the issue as a whole, to sell the securities again to 
investors. From an issuer’s point of view this sounds like a safe bet, because the 
underwriter bears all the risk. Although, the issuer has to pay a substantially 
larger risk premium in these kinds of contracts, otherwise a different contract is 
chosen. In unfavorable situations some portion of the issue is unsold and that 
loss is realized by the underwriter. In Finland firm commitment issues are 
usually sold to institutional investors.  
 
In the best efforts contract the underwriter’s role is to market the issue and re-
ceive a commission for the sold shares. In this contract the underwriter does not 
bear the risk, they only provide a distribution channel for the issue. The best 
efforts contracts are usual, if the premium is too high for firm commitment con-
tracts. According to Sherman (1992), the best efforts-issues are usually sold to 
small investors and are more underpriced than firm commitment-issues. Dun-
bar (1998) though, argued that the size and the price of the issue are more im-
portant factors than which contract is used. Stand-by contracts and all-or-none 
contracts are less common roles than the two previous ones. In stand-by con-
tract the underwriter is committed to buy the remaining shares that were not 
subscribed by the investors. All-or-none contract means that the underwriter 
has an option to cancel the issue if it is not fully subscribed. (Pricewaterhouse-
coopers 2003) 
 
When stocks are eventually offered to the public for the first time, it is followed 
by a subscription period in which the stocks are sold to the public. Trading with 
the newly issued stocks cannot start in the stock exchange before the subscrip-
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tion period has expired. The final decision of whether the IPO is accepted to be 
listed is made by the listing committee. After the new issue has been accepted 
for listing and the subscription period has expired, trading in the secondary 
market can start. (Pricewaterhousecoopers 2003) 
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3. PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
 
 
Numerous empirical findings on the pricing of initial public offerings raise a 
puzzle to those who otherwise believe in market efficiency.  IPOs are a widely 
studied topic and there are some typical anomalies concerning IPOs which 
seem to be repeated in academic research. Firstly, new issues are underpriced 
on average. Secondly, long-run performance of the IPOs tend to underperform 
the market in general. Thirdly, the extent of underpricing is highly cyclical, with 
some periods lasting many months at a time, in which the average initial return 
is much higher.  
 
This section concentrates on the first two anomalies mentioned. In addition to 
IPO anomalies, the role of idiosyncratic risk is also discussed because of its sig-
nificant relation to the thesis. (Ritter 1991:3) 
 
3.1 Underpricing of IPOs 
 
The earliest study considering underpricing was conducted in 1963 by U.S. Se-
curity and Exchange Comission (SEC). SEC was established in 1933 to regulate 
the stock market in U.S. and in 1963 they published the Cohen Report. That was 
the report of The Special Study which purpose was to find grounds for regula-
tions and introduce proposals for new regulations to protect investors in the 
security markets. One of the study’s results involved underpricing, the results 
stated that companies getting listed have positive initial returns on average. In 
1964 Stigler argued in his paper against the The Special Study of SEC.  Stigler’s 
main concern was the manner in which the proposals of the report were 
reached. Consequently, Stigler executed basic tests comparing the performance 
of new common stock issues before and after establishing the SEC. His data 
consisted of all the new issues of industrial stocks with a value exceeding $2.5 
million in 1923-28, and exceeding $5 million in 1949-55, and measures of the 
values of these issues (compared to their offering price) in five subsequent 
years. The comparisons revealed that the investors did little better after estab-
lishing the SEC, though they were constantly outperformed by the benchmark 
index (the market average in NYSE). In addition, Stigler claims that equity of-
ferings are miserable investments in the long-run. Stocks were already losing 
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one-fifth of their value after the first year on average and only performing more 
poorly after the years to come.  
 
The first studies to consider the initial price behavior of newly issued stocks, are 
those of Reilly and Hatfield (1969), Stoll and Curley (1970), McDonald and Fish-
er (1972) and Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) can be considered Common for these 
surveys is that they studied short-run performance as a main target, in addition 
all of them also included at least one year long-run period. Reilly and Hatfield 
(1969) investigated one week and one month short-run performance and also 
one year long-run performance. As benchmark indexes they used the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) and the National Quotation Bureau Over-the-
Counter Industrial Average (OTC). The sample involved 53 new offerings that 
were issued between December 1963 and June 1965. The first week average re-
turn of initial public offerings beat the market index (OTC) by 9.9 %. Interes-
tingly, in the long-run, IPOs performed better having an average return of 43.7 
% (30 stocks out of 53 had a positive gain), while the market index average was 
23.1 %. Their conclusion is that issues which increase in price in initial trading 
tend to also have greater than average returns over the next year. This finding 
about long-run superior returns is not consistent with newer studies. 
 
McDonald and Fisher’s (1972) study was implemented much like that of Reilly 
and Hatfield’s study. Their study consisted of 142 IPOs brought to market in 
1969. The first week excess return (IPO percentage price change adjusted for 
market movements) was 28.5 %. Compared to Reilly and Hatfield’s study 
(9.9%) the price increase in the first week was nearly three times larger. McDo-
nald and Fisher came to a different conclusion about the long-run performance 
than Reilly and Fisher did before. Their main finding is that short-term returns 
were substantial for initial subscribers, but buying the stock a short time after 
IPO did not have predictive value of the future price behavior. Noteworthy in 
these two studies is that they were conducted in different market conditions. 
The earlier study was done in a bull market and the other was mainly done in 
bear market conditions.  
  
Since the late 1960s and early 1970s, research has developed in many ways. Re-
searchers have created new techniques and adopted different variables to ex-
plain the initial price behavior of IPOs. For example, risk factor (Ibbotson and 
Jaffe 1975), industry effect (Johnston 2000), different event windows (Barry & 
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Jennings 1993), size (Loughran 1993; Young & Zaima 1988) and market condi-
tions (Buckland, Herbert & Yeomans 1981) were used in more novel studies to 
contribute to existing literature.  
 
Lehtinen (1992) was the first to study the performance of IPOs in Finnish stock 
markets. Unlike prior research made on the topic, Lehtinen examined the effect 
only in the OTC-market. Data of his paper included 39 IPOs going public 
through OTC market between 1985 and 1989. Lehtinen used two methods to 
evaluate abnormal returns. First, he calculated the initial abnormal returns 
without beta coefficient or any other risk factor. He found that the initial return 
was 20 % on average. Next, Lehtinen took the risk factor into consideration and 
calculated the beta coefficient by using Ibbotson’s (1975) RATS-model. Risk-
adjusted initial abnormal return did not provide additional information. Lehti-
nen concluded that there is no significant difference whether the risk factor is 
used or not in the calculation of abnormal returns of IPOs. Further, underpric-
ing of IPOs were studied by Keloharju (1993) with evidence of 80 IPOs issued 
between January 1984 and July 1989, listed in Helsinki Stock Exchange (at 
present OMX Helsinki). He found that the initial returns were 8, 7 %. 
 
After the early studies, the underpricing research broadened outside the U.S. 
Table 1 summarizes the findings from different countries. It shows that under-
pricing is a world-wide phenomenon only the amount of underpricing varies 
from country to country. China has by far the most substantial underpricing, on 
average 388%. Second is Malaysia with an average underpricing of 80,3%. Next 
are Brazil and Korea with average underpricing, 78,5 % and 78,1% respectively. 
It is clear that China is in a league of its own, but still even the lowest initial un-
derpricing documented in France (4,2%) is statistically significant. Time periods 
are not the same for each research conducted, which may have a significant ef-
fect on the results, but the general idea about the existence of underpricing is 
clearly shown.  (Ritter 1998) 
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Table1 Average initial returns for 33 countries. (Ritter 1998) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2 Reasons for underpricing 
 
Table 1 establishes that underpricing has received a great deal of interest from 
the academic world for several years. This empirical evidence around the world 
inspired a large theoretical literature in 1980s and 1990s trying to rationalize 
why new issues are underpriced.  
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A number of reasons have been documented to shed light on IPO underpricing 
phenomenon. The empirical IPO literature is fairly mature, the main stylized 
facts have been established and most theories have been subjected to rigorous 
empirical testing. By now we know that IPOs are underpriced, and the number 
of IPOs fluctuates over time as well as the amount of underpricing. Time and 
space constraints require the author to be selective. Indeed, for example an en-
tire book by Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) is devoted to IPOs. This chapter 
outlines the main theories of IPO underpricing and discusses the evidence.  
 
There are different ways of classifying theories of IPO underpricing. For exam-
ple, Ritter and Welch (2002) categorize the theories on the basis of whether 
asymmetric information or symmetric information is assumed. Ritter (1998) lists 
eight hypotheses for the IPO underpricing: the winner’s curse hypothesis, the 
market feedback hypothesis, the bandwagon hypothesis, the investment bank-
er’s monopsony power hypothesis, the lawsuit avoidance hypothesis, the sig-
naling hypothesis and the ownership dispersion hypothesis.  
 
Ljungqvist’s (2007) divides the theories of underpricing into four groups: 
asymmetric information, institutional, control considerations, and behavioral 
approaches. The best established group in Ljungqvist’s categorization is the 
theories based on the information asymmetry. The key parties involved in IPO 
are the issuing firm, the underwriter, and the investor. According to the model, 
information asymmetries arise when one of these parties is better informed than 
the others.  
 
Baron (1982) assumes that the underwriting bank knows better about the de-
mand conditions than the issuing firm, leading to a principal-agent problem in 
which underpricing is applied to stimulate optimal selling effort. Welch (1989) 
on the contrary, assumes that the issuing firm is better informed about its true 
value, leading to a situation in which higher-valued firms use underpricing as a 
signal. Rock (1986) claims that some investors are more informed than the other 
key parties and with the help of this knowledge they can avoid subscribing 
overvalued IPOs. 
 
Institutional theories focus on three features of the marketplace: litigation, un-
derwriter’s stabilization activities after listing, and taxes. Control theories argue 
that underpricing helps to allocate the shares so the possible intervention by 
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outside investors is reduced once the company is publicly traded. Behavioral 
theories can assume that irrational investors bid up the price of the new offer-
ings or the issuer does not put sufficient amount of pressure to the underwriter 
to have the underpricing reduced, because they suffer from a behavioral bias. 
 
3.2.1 Asymmetric information models  
 
The winners curse 
 
As mentioned above, theories based on information asymmetry assume that 
one of the parties involved in IPO (the issuing firm, the underwriter or the in-
vestor) knows better about the true value of an IPO than the others. Rock’s 
winner’s curse theory, is probably the best known information asymmetry 
model. Rock claims that investors can be separated into two groups: unin-
formed investors and informed investors. Informed investors know more about 
the true value of the shares on offer than investors in general, the issuing firm, 
or its underwriters. Because of the informational advantage, informed investors 
bid only for attractively priced IPOs, whereas uninformed investors bid for all 
new issues coming onto the market indiscriminately. Thus, uninformed inves-
tors not only face competition for good shares, but they also have a higher 
probability of obtaining bad shares due to the rationing of oversubscribed offer-
ings. Rock argues that the bias in rationing produces an equilibrium offer price 
with a discount sufficient to attract uninformed investors. Implicit in the win-
ner’s curse hypothesis is the notion that when adjusted for rationing and risk, 
uninformed investors’ initial returns should be on average equal to the riskless 
rate, which is just enough to ensure their future participation in the IPO market. 
(Lungqvist 2007) 
 
Winner’s curse hypothesis has been tested and confirmed in many studies over 
the years. The already mentioned Keloharju’s (1993) study in the Finnish stock 
market, proved in practice that the winner’s curse theory reduced the potential 
profits available to an uninformed investor. A recent study of Ting and Tse 
(2006) examined three hypotheses that may explain the large underpricing in 
China; the winner’s curse hypothesis, the ex ante uncertainty hypothesis and 
the signaling hypothesis. They used data sample of 343 online fixed- price offer-
ings (November 1995 to December 1998) and found that the winner’s curse hy-
pothesis is the main reason for the IPO underpricing in China. Furthermore, 
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Boelen and Hubner (2006) also confirmed the winner’s curse hypothesis in Bel-
gian stock market from 1989 to 2004.  
 
Information revelation theory 
 
Bookbuilding, the worldwide leading procedure for selling IPOs,  gives the 
underwriter a high degree of discretion in the pricing and allocation decision. 
Where this procedure is used, underwriters may underprice the issue to induce 
investors to reveal information during the pre-selling period. Information ob-
tained, are then used in setting the price of an IPO. (Ljungqvist 2007) 
 
However, if there are no inducements to reveal positive information, then there 
are no incentives for investors to reveal any. This is because, if the investors 
were to reveal information, it would most likely result as a higher offer price 
and thus lower profits for the investors. Even worse, there is a strong opposite 
incentive to claim that the future prospects of the firm are bad when they ac-
tually are not. This way the investors try to induce the underwriter to set the 
offer price lower. Considering the underlying scenario above, the underwriter’s 
main task is to design a system that serves both the issuing firm and the inves-
tors. The system involves inducing the investors to reveal information truthful-
ly, and it would be their best interest to do so. (Ljungqvist 2007) 
 
According to Benveniste and Spindt (1989), Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990), and 
Spatt and Srivastava (1991), in certain situations, bookbuilding can be such a 
system. After the underwriter collects the information about the interest of var-
ious investors, they then decide to whom to allocate the shares. The investors 
who bid conservatively will receive none, or only few shares. This system will 
discourage investors to misrepresent positive information, as by doing so, 
would exclude themselves from the allocation. On the contrary, investors 
whom choose to bid aggressively are rewarded with large allocation of shares. 
As mentioned earlier, to make it the investors’ best interest to reveal informa-
tion truthfully, the offering must be underpriced.  
 
Ljungqvist argues that issuers benefit from these arrangements, despite the fact 
that their issues are underpriced.  The bookbuilding procedure creates a chance 
to extract positive information and thus in response, raise the offer price even 
though the price rise will continue post-IPO. This is because some money has to 
 28 
be left on the table in form of compensation to the investors for revealing in-
formation. Consequently, the price adjustments during the bookbuilding period 
and the first-day returns are positively associated. This is often referred in IPO-
literature as the ‚partial adjustment‛ phenomenon (Hanley 1993).   
 
3.2.2 Institutional explanations 
 
Legal liability 
 
Legal liability, in other words lawsuit avoidance hypothesis, is mentioned in 
Ritter’s (1998), Ritter & Welch’s (2002) and Lundgqvist’s (2007) explanations of 
IPO underpricing. Earlier studies of Logue (1973) and Ibbotson (1975) provided 
the basis for this idea. They argue that companies willingly underprice the IPOs 
to reduce the likelihood of future lawsuit from a shareholder disappointed with 
the post-IPO returns of their shares. Later, Tinic (1988), Hughes and Thakor 
(1992), and Hensler (1995) confirmed in their studies that issuers underprice the 
issue to reduce their legal liability. Considering the direct cost to the defen-
dants, such as damages, legal fees, diversion of management time, etc. - the 
lawsuits can be very costly. Furthermore, the potential damage to their reputa-
tion may cause losing future clients. The issuer, in this case the plaintiff, is not a 
clear-cut winner in this scenario either; they may face a higher cost of capital in 
future capital issues. 
 
Drake and Vetsuypens (1993) investigated the matter with a sample of 93 IPO 
firms that were subsequently sued after the offering. They were compared to a 
control sample of 93 IPOs that did not face litigation problems. The control 
sample matched on IPO year, offer size, and underwriter prestige. In this cross-
sectional research Drake and Vesuypens found that the sued firms were just as 
underpriced as the control sample, and that underpriced firms were sued more 
often than overpriced firms.  
 
Drake and Vetuypens paper was later criticized by Lowry and Shu (2002). They 
argued that such an ex-post comparison misses the point, because it fails to con-
sider the probability of being sued. Lowry and Shu emphasize that the empiri-
cal analysis of the association between underpricing and the probability of liti-
gation needs to be cautious, because of the following simultaneity problem: the 
firms choose a specific level of underpricing in order to reduce the probability 
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of being sued, but the magnitude of underpricing they choose is dependable on 
the probability of being sued. More simply, higher underpricing reduces the 
probability of being sued, but greater litigation risk requires higher level of un-
derpricing.  
 
Because of this particular simultaneity problem, ordinary least squares esti-
mates are prone to be biased. Therefore, Lowry and Shu suggest a two-stage 
least square approach. As identifying variable in the underpricing equation, 
they employ prior market returns and the IPOs’ expected stock turnover in the 
litigation equation.  
 
Loughran and Ritter (2002) find a positive association between lagged index 
returns and underpricing, but added that there is no reason to expect lagged 
index returns to affect litigation problems many years later. Thus, it can be in-
terpreted that lagged index returns are a plausible instrument for underpricing. 
Whereas, stock turnover may be a plausible instrument for litigation a priori, 
this is because damages tend to increase in the amount of shares traded at the 
‚allegedly‛ misleading prices.  
 
The problem is that different research methods indicate substantially different 
conclusions. Using the OLS (ordinary least squares) estimate, the results sug-
gest that underpricing decrease in the incidence of (actual) lawsuits, indicating 
that firms underprice less, the more frequently they face lawsuits. Whereas, 
adopting the 2SLS model (two stage least squares) leads to an opposite conclu-
sion. In this case, underpricing increases in the predicted probability of law-
suits, consistent with the lawsuit avoidance hypothesis. (Ljungvist 2007) 
 
Lowry and Shu’s study is sensitive to econometric concerns, and using more 
careful tools than prior work, it finds evidence consistent with the proposition 
that firms use underpricing as a form of insurance against future litigation. Un-
fortunately, their empirical model is not able to gauge the economic magnitude 
of this effect (because their system cannot identify all relevant parameters). 
They are thus unable to say if litigation risk has a first-order effect on under-
pricing. (Ljunqvist 2007) 
 
Despite the existence of legal liability, it cannot be considered as a primary de-
terminant of underpricing; this explanation is somewhat U.S. - centric, whereas 
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underpricing is a global phenomenon. For instance, Keloharju’s (1993) found 
from the sample groups that the realized legal liabilities resulting from the IPO 
was zero. This was despite a generally low standard of information content, 
lack of regulation for the issuing of securities and the rare damage compensa-
tion in the Finnish environment. Thus legal liabilities should not have a role to 
play in the pricing or performance of IPOs. In addition to Finland, the risk of a 
lawsuit is not economically significant in Australia (Lee,Taylor, and Walter 
1996),Germany (Ljungqvist 1997), Japan (Beller, Terai, and Levine 1992), Swe-
den (Rydqvist (1994), Switzerland (Kunz and Aggarwal 1994) or the U.K. (Jen-
kinson 1990), all of which experience underpricing.  
 
Stabilization 
 
Stabilization is also acknowledged as a reason for underpricing.  This practice 
of price support is, according to Lundgqvist’s categorization, the second institu-
tional explanation for IPO underpricing. Typically, when trading starts with 
newly issued stock, rather than generating a symmetric distribution around 
some positive mean, underpricing returns will usually peak sharply at zero and 
rarely fall below zero. Ruud (1993) uses these statistical findings as her starting 
point to argue that IPOs are not deliberately underpriced. Her investigation of 
the distribution of returns subsequent the offering indicates that positive mean 
initial returns may reflect the existence of a partially unobserved left (negative) 
tail. Moreover, most IPOs with zero first-day returns are followed by a fall in 
price, according to Ruud, suggests that underwriter price support may account 
for the skewed distribution and hence the positive average price jump, even if 
offering prices are set at expected market value.  
 
Ruud’s argument that the underpricing of IPOs is the byproduct of price sup-
port and not a deliberate choice of action was tested by Asquith, Jones and 
Kieschnick (1998). They estimated the average underpricing returns for the two 
hypothesized distributions of supported and unsupported IPOs.   If Ruud is 
correct in claiming that there is no deliberate underpricing, then the initial re-
turn distribution on supported IPOs should result in a mean of zero. Ruud’s 
argument was not confirmed in Asquith, Jones and Kieschnick’s study. Instead, 
they found that the distribution interpreted as reflecting unsupported firms had 
mean underpricing of approximately 18 %, while the other distribution inter-
preted  as reflecting  supported IPOs had zero mean underpricing. These find-
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ings suggest that underpricing is in fact not a byproduct of price support, but 
rather has independent causes.  
 
3.2.3 Control theories 
 
Going public can often be interpreted as a stage before the forthcoming separa-
tion of ownership and control. An agency problem may arise between non-
managing and managing shareholders, if the separation of ownership and con-
trol is incomplete. A manager’s goal may be to maximize their own wealth, in-
stead of maximizing the expected shareholders’ value. Two opposite models 
have been discovered to explain the underpricing within the context of an 
agency cost approach. 
 
The first approach is presented by Brennan and Franks (1997). They argue that 
underpricing entrenches managers´ private benefits, by allocating shares stra-
tegically to small investors. Managers try to avoid allocating a large proportion 
of the shares to investors, because it induces a higher level of external monitor-
ing. In other words, they are not willing to give up their non-value maximizing 
behavior and this way they do not have to face unwelcome scrutiny.  Grossman 
and Hart (1980) add another benefit that managers experience with the greater 
ownership dispersion, that is it reduces the threat of incumbent managers to be 
ousted from the company in a hostile takeover. 
 
Stoughton and Zechner (1998) presented the opposite approach to Brennan and 
Franks’ model. They argue that it may enhance the value to prefer large outside 
investors, instead of small investors. Soughton and Zechner’s view on the in-
crease of monitoring is positive. They claim that monitoring is a public good, as 
all shareholders benefit, whether or not they contribute to its provision. Accord-
ing to Stoughton and Zechner, managers try to encourage better monitoring by 
allocating a large stake to an investor. In the case where the allocation is sub-
optimally large, underpricing is applied as an added incentive to lure the inves-
tors to participate in the offering.  
 
Ljungqvist describes two reasons why these two approaches are so different. 
The first reason arises from the difference of institutional environments in 
which the models are placed. The second difference involves Stoughton and 
Zechner’s assumption that managers internalize the agency cost they impose on 
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outside investors, via the lower price that investors are willing to pay for the 
stock. This particular internalization is not done in the Brennan-Frank model.  
Ljungqvist states that the ownership and control aspect on underpricing shows 
great potential, but it is still in its infancy.  
 
3.2.4 Behavioral explanations  
 
At the turn of the century initial returns of IPOs increased remarkably. In 1999 
and 2000, for instance, the average initial return for IPO was 71 % and 57 %, 
respectively. In dollar terms, U.S. new issuers left an aggregate of $62 billion on 
the table in those two years alone. Many researchers have become doubtful over 
the past two or so decades, whether information asymmetries, litigation prob-
lems, control and ownership issues could possibly explain underpricing of this 
scale. As a consequence, some argue that one should turn to behavioral expla-
nations for a better understanding of the underpricing phenomenon. (Ritter 
1998; Ljungqvist 2007) 
 
Traditional finance theories argue that investors are rational and therefore make 
optimal decisions. Whereas, behavioral finance relaxes this rationality assump-
tion and argue that investors are still human and therefore are prone to make 
suboptimal decisions. 
 
Cascades 
 
When IPO shares are sold sequentially, later potential investors can condition 
their bids on the bid of earlier investors. This can rapidly lead to ‚cascades‛, in 
which subsequent investors rationally disregard their own information and im-
itate earlier investors. Successful initial sales can be interpreted by later inves-
tors as evidence that earlier investors held favorable information about the of-
fering, encouraging later investors to invest regardless of their own informa-
tion.  Analogously, disappointing initial sales can encourage later investors 
from investing irrespective of their private information. As a result, demand for 
the IPO can either snowball or remain low over time. To prevent the negative 
outcome, an investor banker may underprice the issue to induce a so called 
bandwagon effect. Cascade hypothesis is also referred to as the bandwagon hy-
pothesis or fad effect. (Welch 1992) 
 
 33 
Investor sentiment 
 
Ljungqvist considers investor sentiment as one of the three behavioral explana-
tions to underpricing. Behavioral finance is interested in how irrational or sen-
timent investors can affect stock prices. The probability of such an irrational 
behavior is particularly large in the case of IPOs. Because of the youth, imma-
tureness, and informational opaqueness of the company, they are prone to be 
hard to value. Ljungqvist, Nanda and Singh’s (2006) study was the first to mod-
el an IPO company’s optimal response to the presence of sentiment investors. If 
sentiment investors are confident about the positive future prospects of the IPO 
company, then the issuers goal is to maximize the excess valuation over the 
fundamental value of the company. Ljungqvist, Nanda and Singh state that 
flooding the market with stock will lower the price, and consequently suggest 
that the optimal strategy is to hold back stock in inventory to avoid the price 
fall. In the long-run, the price of the stock will revert to its fundamental value. 
That is, in the long-run IPO returns are negative. The next section discusses this 
particular IPO anomaly in more detail.  
 
Prospect theory 
  
Loughran and Ritter (2002) propose an explanation that emphasizes behavioral 
biases among the IPO firm’s executives, rather than among the investors. They 
provide a cognitive psychology argument to why issuers will not be upset with 
leaving money on the table, in terms of underpricing of an IPO.  Loughran and 
Ritter argue that the key element is the covariance of money left on the table 
and wealth gains accruing to the investors due to underpricing. In this kind of 
situation a behavioral finance term framing shows its importance. Framing 
means that people choose differently among same alternatives, dependent on 
how the issue is framed (Shefrin 2002:23). If the issuers viewed the opportunity 
cost of underpricing by itself, they would most likely be upset leaving millions 
on the table. On the other hand, if the issue is framed in a way that it becomes 
part of the package deal, which also includes good news in wealth gain, then 
there is certainly less resistance.   
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3.3 Long-run performance of IPOs 
 
Those who believe in efficient markets would argue that once an IPO is publicly 
traded it should be regarded as any other stock. Thus, the post-IPO price should 
reflect the stocks’ fundamental value. Similarly to other stocks, after market 
risk-adjusted price behavior should not be predictable for IPOs. Thus, efficient 
markets proponents argue that post-IPO long-run performance is less of an IPO 
issue as it is more of a standard asset-pricing issue. (Ritter & Welch 2002) 
 
Yet, the poor long-run performance is another established anomaly regarding 
the initial public offerings.  Ritter’s (1991) study, The Long-Run Performance of 
Initial Public Offerings, is considered to be the first in the field. By the time Ritter 
accomplished his study, it was already widely acknowledged in the academic 
community (e.g. Ritter 1984, 1987; Miller & Reilly 1987) the existence of two 
anomalies related to IPOs: (1) the short-run under pricing phenomenon, and (2) 
the ‚hot issue‛ market phenomenon. Instead of focusing on those two already 
established anomalies, Ritter concentrated on the long-run performances of 
IPOs with a large database of 1,526 companies going public during years 1975-
1984.  
 
Remarkable in Ritter’s methodology was that he compared the profits of IPOs 
to his own indexes, containing matching firms by size and industry, instead of 
market indexes used in previous studies. Another important addition to his me-
thodology compared to previous literature, is that Ritter excluded the first day 
profits from his data. In this way, he noticed that abnormal returns do not cu-
mulate after the first day of trading. The most notable of his findings was a 
cited third anomaly: in the long-run IPOs tend to be overpriced. This was dem-
onstrated with comparisons in three year period where the issued firms signifi-
cantly underperformed a set of comparable firms. The average holding time 
return was 34,47 % in a the three years after the IPO when the matching stocks 
produced an average total return of 61,86 %. Accordingly, every dollar invested 
in the matching portfolio profited over one-fourth more than the one invested 
in the IPO portfolio.  
 
According to the results that Ritter’s paper provides, it is reasonable to state 
that IPOs are lucrative investments for their subscribers. However, buy-and- 
hold strategy after first day of trading does not provide superior returns in a 36 
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month time period, rather quite the contrary.  In addition, Ritter identified some 
possible reasons for his results, for example, many firms go public near the 
peak of industry-specific fads and the high transaction costs of raising external 
equity partly offsets the long-run returns. (Ritter 1991)  
 
Keloharju (1993) conducted his study much like Ritter. He found mutual results 
in the Finnish stock market about the long-run underperformance. The average 
cumulative value-weighted index adjusted return from the IPO date to month 
36 was -51, 9%. Keloharju, like Ritter earlier, excluded the first-day returns from 
his data. Also notable, is the stock market cycle at the time of the study. Most of 
the IPOs were issued during relatively high activity in the Finnish stock market, 
whereas by the time of the aftermarket of IPOs, the stock market was down-
ward. Consequently, the study excludes the possibility of ‚bad luck‛ in the 
previous studies and approves the effects of financial cycles on IPOs.   
 
Table 2 summarizes the international findings on the long-run performance of 
IPOs. The total abnormal return can be interpreted that buying a portfolio of 
IPOs would leave the investors that much more/less wealth three years later 
than if the money had been invested in the market index or a matching non-
issuing firm portfolio. The poor long-run performance regarding the IPOs is 
evident. However, few exceptions do exist; Korean and Swedish IPOs have 
outperformed the benchmark to some extent in their investigation periods.   
(Ritter 1998) 
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Table 2 International evidence on long-run underperformance. (Ritter 1998) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The most well-known advocate of market efficiency, Fama (1998), argues that 
the long-term underperformance anomaly is fragile. He claims that abnormal 
returns often disappear with some reasonable changes in the methodology. One 
of the many studies Fama criticized in his study was Loughran and Ritter’s 
(1995) paper. They found that companies conducting an IPO or SEO during 
1970-1990 significantly underperform compared to non-issuing firms for five 
years after the issue. The results show that the average buy-and-hold annual 
returns during the five years after the issue is only 5 % for IPOs, and only 7 % 
for SEOs. These results support Ritter’s (1991) conclusions. 
 
Loughran and Ritter claim that the magnitude of underperformance is econom-
ically significant. However, Fama’s view on the subject is quite the opposite. He 
disapproves the way Loughran and Ritter had measured the abnormal returns. 
Fama states that since the long-run buy-and-hold returns in Loughran and Rit-
ter’s study only control for size, their results might be influenced by other va-
riables known to be associated with average stock return, such as book-to-
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market equity (Fama and French 1992), and short-term past return (Jegadees 
and Titman 1993).  
 
Numerous studies have been made regarding the long-run underperformance 
of IPOs, but the results are often not as self righteous as they are with the un-
derpricing phenomenon.  Brav and Gompres (1997) for example, investigated 
whether the involvement of venture capitalists affects the long-run performance 
of IPOs. They find that although the venture-backed IPOs outperform non-
venture-backed IPOs, the underperformance is not an IPO effect. When issuing 
firms are matched to size and book-to-market portfolios that exclude all recent 
firms that have had equity issues, IPOs do not seemingly underperform. Un-
derperformance is more of a characteristic of small, low book-to-market firms 
whether they are IPO firms or not. This result somewhat supports the statement 
made by Fama, that abnormal return often disappears with some reasonable 
changes in the methodology.  
 
It is important to note that the choice of sample period plays a major role in 
how significant this occurred underperformance was. For example, Lee, Taylor 
and Walter (1996) provide evidence from Australian markets about the post-
issue performance of 266 industrial firms going public 1976-1989. According to 
the table 2, Lee, Taylor and Walter found that IPOs perform poorly in the first 
three years, as the average total abnormal return was -46.5%. (This research de-
sign is not constructed to show whether underperformance is related to small 
firms with low book-to-market ratios.) A later study of Rosa, Velayuthen and 
Walter (2003), also in Australian markets, provide evidence indicating that IPOs 
do not underperform in the long-run. They explain that the severe underper-
formance documented by Lee, Taylor and Walter is most likely sample specific. 
Rosa, Velayuthen and Walter also suggested that US results in Ritter’s (1991) 
paper could be partly explained by the influence of specific time period.  
 
Furthermore, long-run returns are prone to be very noisy. Thus, even if the 
long-run returns are extremely low, statistical significance are often not found. 
Brav (2000) states that it can require an abnormal return of -40% (depending 
upon specification) to have a sufficient statistical significance to reject the hypo-
thesis that those long-run buy-and-hold returns are not underperforming.  
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Another study supporting Fama’s claim was conducted by Moshirian, Ng and 
Wu (2010), which investigated the underpricing and long-run underperfor-
mance phenomena in the Asian markets from 1991 to 2004. Their evidence on 
underpricing supports the earlier literature. However, the existence of long-run 
underperformance was not supported. They examined the long-run perfor-
mance in multiple ways, like Fama had insisted, and found that the underper-
formance is indeed dependent on the methodology used for assessment.  
 
It is evident that there are mixed results regarding the long-run performance of 
IPOs. This is mainly because the previous literature on asset-pricing fails to 
provide a conventionally accepted model of risk adjusted performance that 
would be able to measure the post-IPO performance. Thus, it remains vague 
how abnormally poor the post-IPO performance is. Even so, it is obvious that 
IPOs have quite unattractive performance at the same time when the overall 
stock market performed well. All in all, long-run performance of IPOs may be 
the most controversial topic of IPO research, with some researchers supporting 
the efficient markets point of view and others backing up behind the behavioral 
point of view. (Ritter and Welch 2002) 
 
3.4 Explanations for the poor long-run performance  
 
According to Ritter and Welch (2002), there are only two semi-rational explana-
tions for the poor long-run performance of IPOs. Miller (1977) provides the first 
explanation. He assumes that there are short selling constraints, and that indi-
vidual investors posses diverged future expectations of a firm. The most opti-
mistic investors will be the buyers of the IPO. If there is a great deal of uncer-
tainty about the value of an IPO, the spread between optimistic investors’ valu-
ation and pessimistic investors’ valuation will be substantially larger. Over 
time, more information about the firm becomes publicly available, and there-
fore the variance of opinions decreases between optimistic and pessimistic in-
vestors. Consequently, the market price will fall. This explanation is also known 
to be referred as the divergence of opinion hypothesis. 
 
Schultz (2003) offers the second explanation. He examined a phenomenon that 
he referred to as pseudo market timing and show that it can explain the poor 
long-run performance of IPOs. The premise of pseudo market timing, as 
Schultz characterizes it, is that the more firms can receive for their equity the 
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more likely they are to issue new equity even if the market efficiency holds and 
managers have no timing ability. Therefore, more IPOs snowballs successful 
IPOs. Thus, the last larger group of IPOs would underperform and be the ma-
jority of the whole sample. Schultz’ explanation is seemingly close (or the same) 
as the window of opportunity hypothesis.  
 
Additionally, multitude other of studies has addressed the issue of low post-
trading returns of IPOs. Various studies have been able to shed light to the issue 
and revealed a series of factors that have been documented to account for post-
IPO performance, including initial IPO returns (Derrien 2005; Purnanandam 
and Swaminathan 2004), poor post-IPO accounting performance (Mikkelson, 
Partch & Shah 1997), institutional ownership (Houge, Loughran, Suchanek & 
Yan 2001), underwriter prestige (Carter, Dark & Singh 1998), growth (Pastor & 
Veronesi 2003) and managerial overconfidence (Bernardo and Welch 2001). 
Some recent studies argue expected return and idiosyncratic risk (Jiang, Xu & 
Yao 2009; Ang, Hodrick, Xing, Zhang 2006) in general, showing that idiosyn-
cratic volatility is inversely related to future earnings shocks and this link is in-
duced by the information content of idiosyncratic volatility on future earnings. 
Further Wei and Zhang (2006) find that on average, corporate earnings have 
depreciated and their volatilities have increased over the sample period, which 
is more evident for newly listed stocks than for existing stocks. This finding in-
dicates that volatility evolution itself contains essential information in addition 
to volatility level. 
 
3.5 The role of firm-specific risk 
 
Firm-specific risk has caught great attention in recent studies. Previous research 
documents an increase in firm-specific volatility of stock returns over past two 
decades.  Campbell , Lettau, Malkeil & Xu (2001) study illustrates that there has 
been a noticeable increase in firm-specific volatility relative to market volatility. 
Accordingly, correlations among individual stocks and the explanatory power 
of the market model for a typical stock have declined. In the paper they confirm 
and update Schwert’s (1989) finding that market volatility has no significant 
trend using monthly data from 1926 to 1997. When estimating market, industry 
and firm-level variances using daily GRSP data spanning from 1962 to 1997, 
they found that market and industry variance have been fairly stable in the 
sample period. Interestingly, firm-level variance though, displays a large and 
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significant positive trend, more than doubling in past four decades. As a con-
clusion of the paper, it can be said that the market as a whole has not become 
more volatile, but uncertainty on the level of individual firms has increased 
substantially. According to Johnson and Marietta-Westberg (2004), this increase 
is found to be even more dramatic for newly listed firms. They find increase in 
volatility is over twice as large for IPOs than for firms matched to the IPOs 
based on size and book-to-market ratio.  
 
Firm-specific risk has been documented to be responsible for a large proportion 
of total risk. Argue that the high ratio of firm specific risk to total risk indicates 
that more firm-specific information is incorporated into stock prices (Beneda & 
Zhang 2009). Roll (1988) observes low R2 statistics for common asset pricing 
models due to vigorous firm-specific return variation not associated with public 
information. Roll (1988) concludes that this implies ‚either private information 
or else occasional frenzy unrelated to concrete information variation, measured 
relative to total variation, is associated with more informative stock prices, 
where informativeness is defined as how much information stock prices contain 
about future earnings‛. Durnev, Morck, Young and Zarowin (2003) document 
that firms and industries with lower market model R2 statistics exhibit higher 
association between current returns and future earnings, indicating more in-
formation about future earnings are included in current stock prices. This sup-
ports Roll’s first interpretation: a higher ratio of firm-specific risk to total risk 
reflects higher information-laden stock prices and, therefore, more efficient 
stock markets. This positive association with current returns and future earn-
ings appears to have an upward trend ranging from 1983- 1995. 
 
The most important piece of previous literature regarding to the thesis is Be-
nade and Zhang’s (2009) study Heterogeneous relationship between IPO return and 
risk across idiosyncratic variance characteristics. Their study emphasizes the role of 
firm-specific risk on IPO underpricing and post-IPO performance. This particu-
lar paper is used as a benchmark study in the thesis. Beneda and Zhang analyze 
the levels and changes in the post-IPO stock return volatility and provides in-
sight into market responses to the presence of firm-specific risk.  
 
First, they document a negative relation between initial firm-specific volatility 
level and the post-IPO volatility change in that initially low volatility firms have 
more volatility increase and vice verse. According to Benade and Zhang this 
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evidence suggest fundamental firm-specific changes after the IPO. Second, they 
find that underpricing and short-run post-IPO returns are positively related to 
the initial and corresponding firm-specific risk level. This evidence suggests 
that underpricing compensates investor for acquiring costly information and 
firm-specific information is being incorporated into offer prices, as well as post 
trading post-trading prices of new public companies. A similar argument was 
documented by Sherman and Titman (2002), they argue that underpricing off-
sets the investors’ costs of acquiring information. Third, Beneda and Zhang 
found that higher long-run post-IPO performance is related to both lower initial 
risk level and decreasing risk in the first year after the IPO. Derrien (2005) links 
large individual investors’ demand to poor long-run performance and Lough-
ran and Ritter (2002) suggest that pre-IPO shareholders are not upset about 
leaving so much money on the table. 
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4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
This section briefly presents the data used in this study followed by the metho-
dology. Beneda and Zhang’s (2009) novel methods, which are adopted in this 
study, are described in detail. Typical to similar studies, this analysis adopts a 
statistical approach and therefore this section also includes a short presentation 
on how the statistical significance is measured. 
 
4.1 Data  
 
The data for this paper were collected from a couple of different sources. Infor-
mation related to initial public offerings between 1994 and 2006 were obtained 
from the database of University of Vaasa. This data provided issuance dates, 
size of the issues, and subscription prices. The resulting sample consists of 68 
IPOs listed in the Helsinki stock exchange. Two IPOs were excluded from the 
sample because daily return data were not available for the particular compa-
nies.  
 
Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of IPOs over the examination period. In cas-
es before 2002, where the values were in Finnish markka (FIM), an exchange 
rate of 5.94573 was used for conversion into Euros (EUR). Daily time series re-
turns for equities and OMX Helsinki CAP index were assembled from Kauppa-
lehti and OMX Group. 
 
Figure 1 IPOs during the sample period 
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4.2 Methodology 
 
Window sets 
 
The methodology in the thesis follows that used in Beneda and Zhang (2009) 
paper.  This study focuses on 240 trading days after IPO. First, it defines three 
window sets for the analysis. Initial post-IPO windows under examination are 
days (1, 30), (1, 60) and (1, 120), where day 1 represents the first trading day of 
IPO. Correspondingly, the ending windows are days (121, 150), (121, 180) and 
(121, 240).  
 
The changes in different measures of risk and index adjusted returns are meas-
ured across three window sets: days (1, 30) to (121,150), days (1, 60) to (121, 180) 
and days (1, 120) to (121, 240).  First window set is referred as the shortest win-
dow set. Second and third windows sets are called the intermediate and the 
longest window sets, respectively 
  
Initial price changes and index adjusted returns 
 
Initial price changes for IPOs were obtained by calculating the difference be-
tween the subscription price and the closing price of the first trading day. Index 
return for the particular day was attained by calculating the difference between 
the offering price and the closing price. Then by deducting the market return 
from the IPO return, index adjusted abnormal return were obtained. Same me-
thodology is used for measuring the returns in each of the windows and the 
240-day index adjusted returns. 
 
(1) mtitit rrar   
 
where : itar  abnormal return for stock i in period t 
 itr  return on stock i in period t 
 mtr  market return in period t 
 
Average index adjusted abnormal returns are then computed as the sum of ini-
tial abnormal returns adopted from equation 1: 
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(2)  
 
 
where:  tAR  average abnormal return in period t 
 itar  abnormal return for stock i in period t  
 n  the number of stocks 
 
Different measures of risk 
 
Systematic risk is measured by beta obtained by regressing daily returns on the 
OMX Helsinki CAP index returns over each beginning and ending windows. 
Firm-specific risk is the variance of residuals from this particular the regression.   
 
The means and medians for changes in selected measures of risk across three 
window sets are measured for the entire sample. The changes in risk, variance 
ratios, are calculated by the variance of days (121,150), (121,180), and (121,240) 
divided by the variance of days (1, 30), (1, 60), and (1,120), respectively. As in, 
that the ending window variance is divided by the beginning window variance 
in all three window sets. Variance ratios are calculated for firm-specific risk, 
total risk and market risk. So a value greater than 1 indicates an increase in the 
selected measure of risk.  
 
The change in beta and change in index adjusted return (variance ratios are not 
calculated for beta and returns since these can take on negative values) is com-
puted as the beta/return of the ending windows days (121,150), (121,180), and 
(121,240) minus the beta/return of the beginning windows days (1,30), (1,60), 
and (1,120), respectively. Here a value greater than zero indicates an increase in 
beta or index adjusted return in the ending window. 
 
Cross-sectional analysis 
 
To study the cross-sectional heterogeneity, both two-way and a four-way split 
sample analyses are adopted. Across groups of high/low variance level and/or 
variance increasing/decreasing IPO firms, heterogeneous relationships between 
volatility and underpricing and between volatility and post-IPO performance 
are investigated. This cross-sectional analysis becomes more familiar in the next 
section, where the results are discussed. 
it
n
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Statistical significance 
 
T-test assesses the statistical significance of the difference between two inde-
pendent sample means. T-test is used in the analysis to see whether the changes 
in variance ratios, index adjusted returns and systematic risk are statistically 
significant.  
 
 
 
(3)  
  
 
Where: D = the sample average difference between each pair of observa-
tions 
 DS = the sample standard deviation of the differences 
 
0D
 = the population mean difference under the null hypothesis 
 n = the number of pairs observation 
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D
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5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
 
This section discusses the empirical findings of the paper. The most significant 
results are presented in the tables and discussed further in writing. The results 
are compared to the most notable findings of Beneda and Zhang’s (2009) paper. 
First, descriptive statistics of the sample are reviewed. Then, post-IPO volatility 
movements across different window sets are reported. Under the following 
subheading, the empirical data is divided into to two, based on whether the 
volatility is increasing or decreasing. Next, the sample is divided into two, 
based on the initial volatility level. The last subheading, documents the results 
when the sample is divided into two, based on both the initial volatility level 
and the volatility change. 
 
5.1 Descriptive statistics of the sample 
 
Table 3 Descriptive statistics of the sample.  
year 
Number of 
ipos 
Underpricing 
(mean) 
240-day in-
dex adjusted 
return mean 
60-day firm-
specific  risk 
(mean) 
60-day 
systematic 
risk 
1994 5 15,39 % 5,36 % 0,391 0,495 
1995 4 1,17 % 28,66 % 0,071 0,342 
1996 2 18,89 % 55,25 % 0,222 -0,021 
1997 10 24,14 % 46,77 % 0,934 0,563 
1998 7 16,98 % 74,90 % 0,316 0,966 
1999 19 36,31 % 28,13 % 2,929 0,920 
2000 13 28,40 % -9,60 % 3,123 0,869 
2001 0 
   
  
2002 1 -31,06 % -61,78 % 0,743 -1,670 
2003 0 
   
  
2004 1 5,91 % -8,91 % 0,042 -0,286 
2005 2 4,38 % -22,46 % 0,105 0,691 
2006 4 4,30 % 61,25 % 0,143 0,456 
  68         
  mean 22,24 % 26,22 % 1,648 0,679 
  median 4,12 % -0,55 % 0,231 0,585 
 
Table 3 documents the summary statistics of IPO distribution on a yearly basis, 
as well as a brief overview on the main variables used in this study. The table 
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shows that the IPOs are clustered in time, majority of the IPOs occurring 1997-
2000 (50 IPOs). Average underpricing, for the whole 68 IPO sample, is 22.24%. 
However, the average underpricing experiences dramatic changes over the 
sample period, peaking around the dot com bubble. The most recent IPOs of the 
sample are substantially less underpriced, on average, than the earlier IPOs of 
the sample. Keloharju (1993) reported an average underpricing of 8.7% with a 
sample that included 80 IPOs listed in the Finnish stock exchange between 
1984-1989. This finding confirms the notion that underpricings vary to a large 
extent over the years. Interestingly, the difference between the overall mean 
underpricing and median underpricing is quite substantial, indicating that the 
distribution is strongly skewed to the right, even if the outliers are excluded.  
 
Also over the sample period, 240-day index adjusted returns, 60-day firm-
specific risk and 60-day systematic risk experience dramatic change.  A some-
what strong association between firm-specific risk and underpricing can al-
ready be seen from this table. This association is discussed further in the re-
maining parts of the results. 
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5.2 Post-IPO volatility movement 
 
Table 4 Changes in risk. 
  
Systematic 
risk (beta) 
Firm-specific 
risk variance 
Total risk 
variance 
Market risk 
variance 
Index  
adjusted 
return 
Panel A. Days 
(121,150)/(1,30) 
     1-30days 0,761 3,0520 3,0395 0,0461 21,46 % 
121-150days 0,760 0,3286 0,3934 0,0636 -2,97 % 
  
     Variance ratio/change:mean 0,000 1,2457 1,2448 2,6508 -24,42 % 
t-value 0,004 2,1304 2,1212 -1,8572 3,428 
Variance ra-
tio/change:median 0,104 0,6213 0,6422 1,1718 -10,56 % 
  
     Panel B. Days 
(121,180)/(1,60) 
     1-60days 0,679 1,6476 1,6781 0,0429 38,89 % 
121-180days 0,717 0,4252 0,4744 0,0569 1,33 % 
  
     Variance ratio/change:mean 0,037 1,3632 1,3768 1,9058 -37,55 % 
t-value -0,461 1,923 1,910 -2,318 2,721 
Variance ra-
tio/change:median 0,040 0,8485 0,9638 1,3748 -14,44 % 
  
     Panel C. Days 
(121,240)(1,120) 
     1-120days 0,732 1,015 1,0835 0,0471 21,42 % 
121,240days 0,723 0,432 0,4880 0,0578 -1,43 % 
  
     Variance ratio/change:mean -0,008 1,4081 1,4415 1,5612 -22,85 % 
t-value 0,128 1,733 1,720 -2,233 2,802 
Variance ra-
tio/change:median -0,008 1,1652 1,1601 1,1759 -22,70 % 
  
     Panel D. (240days) 
     risk/return 0,767 0,7319 0,7858 0,0526 26,22 % 
 
Table 4 reports the means and medians for changes in selected measures of risk 
across the three window sets for the entire sample. To better examine these 
changes, like already stated in the methodology section, three beginning post-
IPO windows are defined: days (1, 30), days (1, 60) and days (1, 120). Corres-
ponding ending windows are defined as following: days (121, 150), days (121, 
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180) and days (121, 240). The changes in risk are measured across three window 
sets: days (1, 30) to (121,150), days (1, 60) to (121, 180) and days (1, 120) to (121, 
240). Table 4, panels A-C, respectively, correspond to these three window sets.  
 
Table 4 shows the general picture of the aftermarket volatility behavior. Firstly, 
the results indicate that firm-specific risk accounts for the major part of the total 
risk. This finding is consistent with Beneda and Zhang (2009), and Durnev et al. 
(2001, 2003). Secondly, also consistent with Beneda and Zhang, the mean va-
riance ratios for firm-specific risk and total risk are greater than one for all win-
dow sets, indicating that the after-market firm-specific risk increases for the 
sample overall. This finding gives an answer to the first research question of the 
paper ‚what is the trend of post-IPO firm-specific risk behavior‛. Statistical sig-
nificances for the variance increases are somewhat low for the two longer win-
dow sets. Later in the following table, it can be observed that the volatilities be-
have quite differently when examined cross-sectionally. This methodology also 
improves the significance levels. 
 
Thirdly, according to the t-values, the market risk increases significantly across 
the two longer windows. However, despite the increase in market risk, the sys-
tematic risk remains somewhat constant across the same windows. This may be 
interpreted partly that the firm-specific risk increases and the explanatory pow-
er of beta decreases. 
 
Table 4 also presents, not surprisingly, that the index-adjusted returns decline 
substantially from the beginning window to the ending window. Index ad-
justed returns overall, become a more relevant issue when the sample is di-
vided into different sub groups. 
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5.3 Increasing versus decreasing volatility firms 
 
Table 5 Risk and return characteristics of firms with increasing versus decreasing idiosyncratic 
volatility. 
  
Days (1,30) 
to(121,150) 
Days(1,60) to 
(121,180) Days(1,120)to(121,240) 
  
Var inc-
reasing 
Var dec-
reasing 
Var inc-
reasing 
Var dec-
reasing 
Var inc-
reasing 
Var dec-
reasing 
Number of firms 21 47 31 37 39 29 
  
  
    
  Panel A. Risk measures 
  
    
  Beginning window firm-
specific  variance 0,223 4,316 0,261 2,810 0,288 1,994 
Ending window firm-
specific  variance 0,580 0,216 0,579 0,296 0,565 0,252 
Firm-specific  variance 
ratio:mean 3,116 0,410 2,445 0,457 2,124 0,445 
 t-value 3,720 -2,254 5,037 -2,224 3,928 -2,363 
Beginning window sys-
tematic risk (beta) 0,670 0,801 0,644 0,709 0,589 0,924 
Ending window syste-
matic risk 0,873 0,710 0,706 0,725 0,713 0,736 
  
  
    
  Panel B. Underpricing 
and index adjusted re-
turns 
  
    
    
  
    
  Underpricing 1,64 % 32,02 % 6,53 % 36,14 % 6,45 % 44,42 % 
Beginning window in-
dex adjusted return -7,56 % 34,42 % 15,06 % 58,85 % 16,84 % 27,59 % 
Ending window index 
adjusted return -2,62 % 0,26 % 4,68 % -1,47 % 1,33 % -5,15 % 
t-Value difference paired means  -0,750 -3,453 0,990 -2,588 -1,315 -3,074 
Index adjusted return 
over 240days -3,69 % 39,59 % 36,50 % 17,61 % 25,55 % 27,13 % 
Median -28,63 % 12,13 % 12,13 % -9,35 % 0,53 % -8,91 % 
 
From the results reported in the previous table we noticed that for the entire 
sample of IPOs, the increases in firm-specific risks are statistically quite low for 
the two longer window sets. But in table 5, when the sample is divided into two 
sub-samples across the three different window sets with the respect of variance 
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change, the variance ratios become a lot more significant. The increases of firm-
specific risk had t-values of 3.720, 5.037 and 3.928 for the respective window 
sets: (days 1, 30 to 121, 150), (days 1, 60 to 121, 180) and (days 1,120, 121,240), all 
statistically significant at 1 % level. The decreases of firm-specific risk were not 
as significant as the increases were. However, all the t-values are significant at 5 
% level, the respective t-values are -2.254, -2.224 and -2.363. 
 
It can be observed that variance increasing firms have lower initial variance 
level on average, with an ending window variance level very close to the be-
ginning window variance level of variance decreasing firms. Beneda and Zhang 
also found an opposite trend, which could not be found in this sample. They 
interpret this finding that the market may be adapting to critical information 
about the possible changes in firm specific risk. It is also possible that the mar-
ket participants’ price responses in the beginning window IPO aftermarket 
could be inaccurate which could result in unpredictable volatility patterns. The 
market has a tendency to correct these patterns as the time goes by.  
 
Table 5 also documents evidence on how the systematic risk changes across the 
three window sets. Firms with increasing volatilities have relatively smaller 
beginning window systematic risk than firms with decreasing volatilities. Vola-
tility increasing firms also have increasing systematic risk across all window 
sets. Whereas, volatility decreasing firms, also experience a decrease in syste-
matic risk in the shortest and in the longest window sets.  
 
Beneda and Zhang’s findings were quite similar considering the systematic risk. 
However, one noteworthy difference can be found from table 5. They reported 
that the volatility increasing firms’ systematic risk remains fairly constant. Whe-
reas, according to this study, the volatility increasing firms also experience an 
increase in systematic risk.  Beneda and Zhang interpret their finding consistent 
with the notion that firm-specific risk may account for the major part of total 
risk. Like already stated in this study, firm-specific risk also accounts for the 
major part of total risk, but it seems that systematic risk might have a larger ef-
fect in a thin security market as the Finnish stock market.  
 
Table 5, Panel B documents decrease in index-adjusted returns in all sub-
samples, apart from one exception. The sub-sample of variance increasing firms 
in the shortest window set, in which the ending window return is better than 
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the beginning window return. However, this difference is not statistically sig-
nificant. In addition, this particular sub-sample is the only one to report nega-
tive index adjusted returns (- 7.56%) in the beginning window. All the other five 
sub-samples document positive index-adjusted returns in the beginning win-
dow. The ending window returns appear to be similar in the two longer win-
dow sets. Variance increasing (decreasing) firms report positive (negative) in-
dex-adjusted returns. 
 
Panel B also reports that variance decreasing firms are notably more under-
priced than the variance increasing firms. Beneda and Zhang found that the 
initial volatility level is more important in explaining the underpricing than the 
volatility change. Therefore, the underpricing issue will be discussed further, 
when the initial variance levels are taken into consideration.  
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5.4 Implications of the initial volatility level 
 
Table 6 Risk and return characteristics of firms with low versus high idiosyncratic volatility. 
  
Days (1,30) 
to(121,150) Days(1,60) to (121,180) Days(1,120)to(121,240) 
  Low Var High Var Low Var High Var Low Var High Var 
Number of firms 34 34 34 34 34 34 
  
      Panel A. Risk measures 
      Beginning window firm-
specific  variance 0,126 5,978 0,122 3,173 0,119 1,911 
Ending window firm-
specific  variance 0,171 0,486 0,244 0,606 0,192 0,671 
Firm-specific  variance 
ratio:mean  1,742 0,749 1,843 0,883 1,729 1,188 
t-value difference 
paired means 1,254 -2,211 2,323 -2,076 2,205 -1,884 
Median 0,714 0,402 1,442 0,577 1,185 0,960 
Beginning window sys-
tematic risk (beta) 0,508 1,014 0,451 0,965 0,398 1,065 
Ending window syste-
matic risk 0,611 0,910 0,469 0,908 0,459 0,987 
  
      Panel B. Underpricing 
and index adjusted re-
turns 
      Underpricing 2,02 % 43,26 % 3,24 % 42,05 % 4,64 % 40,65 % 
Beginning window in-
dex adjusted return 1,06 % 41,86 % 4,16 % 73,62 % 4,80 % 38,05 % 
Ending window index 
adjusted return -2,44 % -3,49 % 0,50 % 2,17 % 3,36 % -6,22 % 
t-Value difference 
paired means  
      Index adjusted return 
over 240days 17,24 % 35,20 % 12,88 % 39,56 % 10,54 % 41,90 % 
Median -2,21 % -0,08 % -2,21 % -0,08 % -6,46 % 11,67 % 
 
Table 6 aims to establish the implications of the initial volatility level. Moreover, 
if there are heterogeneous patterns of volatility change, underpricing, and af-
termarket IPO performance across IPOs of different initial volatility levels. The 
sample of IPOs is divided into two equally sized sub-samples based on the me-
dian variance of the three beginning windows. The previous table investigates 
the return volatility behavior of firms with increasing versus decreasing volatili-
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ties.  Whereas, table 6 investigates return volatility behavior of two sub-samples 
of high versus low volatility firms. 
 
Because of the sample construction, the mean variances for these two sub-
samples (Panel A) are substantially different at the beginning windows. Interes-
tingly, the difference between the mean variances at the ending windows are 
still dramatic, however the differences shrink. Characteristic for low variance 
firms across all window sets is that they experience an increase in volatility ac-
cording to the variance ratios. The t-statistics shows that the increase is not sig-
nificant for the shortest window firms, yet the increases of two longer windows 
are statistically significant at 5 % level for the two longer windows. On the con-
trary, the firms of high initial variance show significant variance decrease over 
the first two window sets. The 120-day high variance sub-sample show little 
change in variance according to variance ratio (1.188).  
 
It is clear that the firms with lowest beginning window volatilities had the 
highest increases at the ending window volatilities, on average. The firms of the 
low variance sub-samples also had lower systematic risk which increases only a 
little in the ending window. The firms of the high variance sub-samples have a 
considerably larger systematic risk, but reducing systematic risk at the ending 
window. This finding is similar to Beneda and Zhang finding, which they in-
terpret as an indication that firm-specific risk dominates over the market risk.  
 
Table 6, Panel B, show how the initial volatility level affects on underpricing 
and aftermarket performance. The firms with the highest average of 30, 60, 120 
day firm-specific variance experience by far the most dramatic underpricing (an 
average of 43.26 %, 42.05 % and 40.65 %, respectively).  The results indicate a 
strong association between underpricing and initial variance level. These results 
are almost identical with Beneda and Zhang paper.  
 
They also find a negative relation between volatilities and ending window ad-
justed returns and adjusted returns for the whole 240-day period. In this study, 
the results about those associations are not as clear. Considering the association 
between volatilities and ending window adjusted returns, a negative associa-
tion can be found for the shortest and for the longest window sets. However, 
the intermediate window set (days 1,60 to 121,180) shows positive relation. At 
first glance, when looking at the 240-day index adjusted returns it appears that 
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there is a positive association between volatilities and the returns. High volatili-
ty firms have higher 240-day index adjusted returns in all sub-samples than the 
respective low variance sub-sample firms. However, if the first day returns 
were excluded (underpricing) that would result closer to a negative association 
between the volatilities and 240-day index-adjusted returns.  The firms with 
lowest underpricing are beating the market after the first day of trading until 
the 240th trading day, on average. Whereas, the most underpriced firms are not 
collecting superior returns after the first day of trading. For an illustrative ex-
ample, if an investor bought a severely underpriced IPO stock after first day of 
trading, it would not most likely get superior returns in 240-day time-span. But 
buying a less underpriced IPO after the first day of trading could be a lucrative 
investment decision.  
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5.5 Implications of both initial volatility level and change 
 
Table 7 Four-way split sample analysis. 
Panel A. Days (1,30) to (121,150)         
  
High and 
increasing 
volatility 
firms 
High and 
decreasing 
volatility 
firms 
Low and 
increasing 
volatility 
firms 
Low and 
decreasing 
volatility 
firms 
Number of firms 7 27 14 20 
  
    Firm-specific  volatility (1-30days) 0,460 7,408 0,104 0,142 
Firm-specific  volatility (121-150days) 1,126 0,320 0,307 0,077 
Firm-specific volatility (1-240days) 
    Increase in firm-specific volatility 
(1,30 to 121,150) 1,472 -0,697 2,438 -0,445 
t-value 3,013 -2,314 3,013 -6,578 
Systematic risk (beta) (1-30 days) 0,955 1,029 0,528 1,078 
Systematic risk (beta) (121-150 days) 0,894 0,914 0,863 -0,029 
  
    Underpricing 1,05 % 54,20 % 1,94 % 2,08 % 
Median -2,95 % 24,84 % 1,79 % 1,42 % 
Index adjusted return (1-30 days) -17,68 % 57,29 % -2,49 % 3,54 % 
Median -13,71 % 34,32 % -4,46 % 1,42 % 
Index adjusted return (121-150 days) -26,23 % 2,40 % -2,16 % -2,63 % 
Median -34,41 % -1,44 % -5,30 % -5,82 % 
t-value 0,851 -3,468 0,084 -1,305 
Index adjusted return (1-240 days) -43,18 % 55,53 % 16,06 % 18,07 % 
Median -38,99 % 21,98 % 5,84 % -9,13 % 
  
    Panel B. Days (1,60) to (121,180)         
  
High and 
increasing 
volatility 
firms 
High and 
decreasing 
volatility 
firms 
Low and 
increasing 
volatility 
firms 
Low and 
decreasing 
volatility 
firms 
Number of firms 11 23 20 14 
  
    Firm-specific volatility (1-60days) 0,531 4,437 0,112 0,136 
Firm-specific volatility (121-180days) 0,983 0,426 0,358 0,082 
Firm-specific volatility (1-240days) 
    Increase in firm-specific volatility 
(1,60 to 121,180) 0,969 -0,636 1,706 -0,390 
t-value 4,554 -2,280 3,130 -5,036 
Systematic risk (beta) (1-60 days) 0,958 0,884 0,472 0,421 
Systematic risk (beta) (121-180 days) 0,919 0,986 0,589 0,296 
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    Underpricing 12,33 % 56,26 % 3,34 % 3,08 % 
Median 7,95 % 21,75 % 2,21 % 0,59 % 
Index adjusted return (1-60 days) 22,57 % 98,04 % 10,94 % -5,53 % 
Median 15,90 % 39,96 % 4,04 % -3,46 % 
Index adjusted return (121-180 days) 2,70 % 1,91 % 5,77 % -7,02 % 
Median -26,29 % 2,27 % -7,20 % -5,15 % 
t-value -0,871 -2,705 -0,483 -0,250 
Index adjusted return (1-240 days) 51,52 % 33,84 % 28,23 % -9,04 % 
Median -25,96 % 0,53 % 14,84 % -18,66 % 
  
    Panel C. Days (1,120) to (121,240)         
  
High and 
increasing 
volatility 
firms 
High and 
decreasing 
volatility 
firms 
Low and 
increasing 
volatility 
firms 
Low and 
decreasing 
volatility 
firms 
Number of firms 16 17 23 12 
  
    Firm-specific volatility (1-120days) 0,525 3,315 0,122 0,123 
Firm-specific volatility (121-240days) 1,010 0,372 0,256 0,081 
Firm-specific volatility (1-240days) 
    Increase in firm-specific volatility 
(1,120 to 121,240) 1,108 -0,694 1,284 -0,358 
t-value 3,267 -2,482 3,062 -5,048 
Systematic risk (beta) (1-120 days) 0,854 1,299 0,404 0,393 
Systematic risk (beta) (121-240 days) 0,933 1,068 0,560 0,267 
  
    Underpricing 10,38 % 70,31 % 3,71 % 7,73 % 
Median 3,05 % 41,55 % 1,71 % 5,52 % 
Index adjusted return (1-120 days) 37,37 % 38,91 % 2,55 % 11,56 % 
Median 14,18 % 31,28 % -4,21 % 19,44 % 
Index adjusted return (121-240 days) -50,07 % 0,45 % 11,09 % -13,08 % 
Median -35,78 % -5,25 % -5,72 % -11,32 % 
t-value -2,448 -2,250 0,711 -2,657 
Index adjusted return (1-240 days) 39,67 % 45,27 % 15,72 % 1,44 % 
Median 2,53 % 21,98 % 0,53 % -9,13 % 
 
Table 7 takes the effects of both volatility level and volatility change into con-
sideration at the same time. To isolate the contribution of these two factors, a 
four-way split sample is adopted. First, the sample is divided into two equally 
sized sub-samples based on the median volatility levels in the three beginning 
windows (same as table 6). Then, each of these two sub-groups is divided fur-
ther into two groups based on whether the volatility is increasing or decreasing. 
 58 
Consequently, the entire sample is divided into four sub-samples across the 
three window sets: (1) firms with beginning window high and increasing vola-
tility, (2) beginning window high and decreasing volatility, (3) firms with be-
ginning window low and increasing volatility, and (4) firms with beginning 
window low and decreasing volatility.  
 
Table 7 reports the findings for these four sub-samples, their firm-specific risk, 
systematic risk and index adjusted returns across three window sets. Under-
pricing and 240-day index adjusted returns are also reported for each sub-
sample. The t-values show that the changes in firm-specific risk in all four sub-
groups are significant at least in 5 % level across the three window sets (Panels 
A-C). It is obvious that firms with decreasing variances have higher beginning 
window variances than the firms with increasing variances. 
 
Table 7, Panel A, documents that only seven firms of the 34 firms in the 30-day 
high volatility group, have increasing volatility across the shortest window set 
(days 1,30 to 121,150). Those 7 firms experience an average of 147.2% increase in 
firm-specific risk (t-value 3.013). The majority (27 out of 34) of the 30-day high 
volatility category experience an average decrease of -69.7% (t-value -2,314) in 
firm-specific risk. The 30-day low volatility firms are more evenly spread into 
increasing (14 firms) and decreasing (20 firms) volatility categories than the 
high volatility firms.  The increases and decreases had t- values 3.013 and -6.578, 
respectively.  Both of the high volatility groups have relatively high systematic 
risk and decreasing systematic risk in the ending window. Low and increasing 
firms had relatively low and increasing beta, whereas low and decreasing vola-
tility firms experienced an opposite trend.  
 
Beneda and Zhang findings suggest that the underpricing is associated with 
post-trading level of volatility but not the change in volatility. Table 7, Panel A, 
indicates that the underpricing is related to both the initial volatility and the 
volatility change. 27 firms of the high and decreasing volatility group have an 
average of 54.2% underpricing. The remaining 7 firms are only little under-
priced, 1.1% on average. However, it should be noted that the sample is too 
small to make any conclusive assumptions. Underpricing is also very moderate 
across the two groups in the 30-day low volatility sub-sample. The low and in-
creasing volatility and low and decreasing volatility firms have average under-
pricing 1.94% and 2.08%, respectively.  
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According to table 7, panel A, the worst average beginning window, ending 
window and 240-day index adjusted return is associated with high initial vola-
tility level and increasing volatility in the ending window. Those seven firms in 
that particular category document average of -17.68%, -26.23% and -43.18% for 
the respective index adjusted returns. Decreasing volatility firms, regardless of 
initial volatility level, have declining index adjusted returns in the ending win-
dow. Whereas, low and increasing volatility firms show slight improvement in 
the ending window. All the three sub-groups, apart from the high and increas-
ing volatility firms, have positive 240-day index adjusted returns.  However, the 
high and decreasing volatility firms’ 240-day index adjusted return (55.53%) 
would be close to the market return, if the first day closing price was used as a 
reference point. The 30-day low volatility firms seem to outperform the market 
index, whether the volatility change is increasing or decreasing. The low and 
increasing volatility firms and the low and decreasing volatility firms have av-
erage 240-index adjusted returns of 16.06% and 18.07%, respectively. 
 
Table 7, Panel B, documents the result of the intermediate window set (days 
1,60 to 121,180). The findings are somewhat similar with Panel A. Firstly, as 
mentioned earlier, the volatility increases and decreases are significant in all 
four sub-groups. Secondly, the changes in systematic risk have the same pat-
terns in three sub groups as they did in panel A. The group of high and decreas-
ing volatility firms, surprisingly, has increasing systematic risk in the ending 
window. Thirdly, the most notable underpricing is still found in the high and 
decreasing firm category, in which they report an average of 56.26% underpric-
ing. However, the underpricing is also evident in the high and increasing vola-
tility category (12.33%), if the group was divided into two based on the 60-day 
median volatility level and further into four based on the volatility change in 
the ending window. 
 
Lastly, the most significant difference between the results of Panel A and Panel 
B arises from the index adjusted returns. The average 240-day index adjusted 
return in high and increasing volatility firms have changed from -43.8% to 
51.2%. But when looking at the respective changes in median returns (from -
39.99% to 25.96%), it is still obvious that most of the firms in this sub-group per-
form poorly in the first 240 days of trading. 
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Panel C documents the results of the longest window set (days 1,120 to 121,240). 
Here again the changes in volatilities are significant in all of the four sub-
groups. The changes in systematic risks move in line with the changes of firm-
specific risks, as in volatility increasing (decreasing) firms also have increasing 
(decreasing) systematic risk, inconsistent with Beneda and Zhang. This finding 
may be explained partly with a small sample size and the fact that systematic 
risk could account for more of the total risk in the thin security markets.  
 
In the longest window set the underpricing phenomenon is even more evident 
with the high and decreasing volatility firms. Their average underpricing is as-
tonishing 70.31%. The high and increasing volatility category experience dra-
matic changes in their first 240 days in the stock exchange.  First, they are un-
derpriced 10,38%, on average, making them second most underpriced sub-
group in this window set.  Second, they perform well in the beginning window 
(37.37%), but crash in the ending window (-50.07%). According to Panel C, the 
largest sub-group is the low and increasing volatility firms (23 firms). They are 
the least underpriced issues and they perform the best, 11.09 % on average, in 
the ending window. 
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6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects of post-IPO firm-specific 
volatility level and volatility change on IPO-underpricing and post-IPO per-
formance, cross-sectionally for new public companies in Finland. Three re-
search questions are raised to address the focus of the study. First, what is the 
trend of post-IPO firm-specific volatility behavior? Second, how are the post-
IPO return volatility levels and changes in return volatility related to the IPO 
underpricing? Third, how is the long-run post-IPO performance related to re-
turn volatility level and change?  
 
In general, the results show an increase in firm-specific volatility, answering the 
first research question. However, the results indicate heterogeneous patterns in 
volatility evolution, when examined across high/low volatility firms or firms 
with increasing or decreasing volatilities. A negative association was found be-
tween the initial firm-specific volatility level and the post-IPO volatility change, 
in that initially low volatility firms experience volatility increase and vice verse. 
This finding is consistent with Beneda and Zhang (2009), which can be inter-
preted that the market may be adapting to critical information about the possi-
ble changes in firm-specific risk. 
 
The results indicate a strong association between high initial firm-specific vola-
tility and underpricing. This finding is almost identical with Beneda and 
Zhang’s paper. However, when the sample is divided into four sub-samples 
based on both the initial volatility level and volatility change, the results are 
inconsistent with the earlier literature. Beneda and Zhang document that the 
underpricing is related only to the high initial volatility level, not the change in 
volatility. Whereas, this study argues that the underpricing is related to both 
high initial volatility and subsequent decrease in volatility.  
 
According to numerous previous studies, it is reasonable to say that IPOs are 
lucrative investments for their subscribers, on average. The question is what 
happens after the first day of trading?  Some argue that IPOs are poor invest-
ments in the long-run, and the others disagree. This paper attempts to find how 
the long-run aftermarket performance is related to initial volatility level and 
change. If the first day returns are excluded, the initial low volatility firms seem 
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to outperform the high volatility firms in the first 240 trading days. Further-
more, low and increasing volatility firms are far better performers than the low 
and decreasing volatility firms. Whereas, Beneda and Zhang find that the best 
performance in the long-run is related to low initial volatility level and decreas-
ing volatility in the first year after IPO. It should be noted that this study has 
examined only 68 IPOs, so it may be misleading to do any generalizations.   
 
Yet, there may be lucrative investment strategies concerning IPOs. Firstly, if 
you can, you should always subscribe an IPO, because of its great upside poten-
tial on the first day of trading. How to pursue after the first day of trading is 
dependable on the underpricing. Highly underpriced issues do not perform 
well in the long-run, so those shares should be sold after the first day. IPOs that 
are only little underpriced are low initial volatility firms and therefore have a 
better chance in beating the market index.  However, the firms in the low and 
decreasing volatility category, like already stated, do not gain superior returns 
in the long-run. 
 
The results also confirm previous findings that firm-specific risk accounts for 
the major part of total risk. Interestingly, one exception considering the role of 
systematic risk was found between this study and Beneda and Zhang’s study. 
They reported that firms with increasing firm-specific risk have fairly stable 
systematic risk. Whereas, according to the empirical findings of this paper, the 
firms with increasing firm-specific risk also experience increase in systematic 
risk. Thus, it seems that systematic risk has a larger effect on total risk in a thin 
security market as Finnish stock market. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Data sample used in the study 
 
IPO date Company 
28.4.1994 Lounais-Suomen Sähkö (Länsivoima) 
11.7.1994 Santasalo-JOT (Componenta) 
27.9.1994 Raute 
10.11.1994 Kemira 
24.11.1994 Espoon Sähkö 
1.6.1995 Nokian Renkaat 
14.6.1995 Suunto 
27.6.1995 Rauma 
27.11.1995 Neste 
27.3.1996 KCI Konecranes International 
19.7.1996 Kauppakaari 
3.4.1997 PK Cables (PKC Group) 
24.4.1997 Nordic Aluminium 
28.4.1997 Keski-Suomen Puhelin (Yomi) 
5.5.1997 Incap 
9.6.1997 Kyro (Glaston) 
17.6.1997 Rocla 
25.11.1997 Helsingin Puhelin 
26.11.1997 Elcoteq Network 
2.12.1997 Jaakko Pöyry Group 
9.12.1997 Metsä Tissue 
30.4.1998 A-Rakennusmies (Ramirent) 
15.5.1998 PMJ automec (Cencorp) 
1.6.1998 Sponda 
15.9.1998 JOT Automation Group (Elektrobit) 
17.11.1998 Sonera 
4.12.1998 Rapala Normark (Rapala VMC) 
18.12.1998 Fortum 
11.3.1999 Janton 
12.3.1999 Marimekko 
15.3.1999 TJ Group 
23.3.1999 Eimo 
30.3.1999 Teleste 
12.4.1999 Stonesoft 
1.6.1999 Nedecon (Oral Hammaslääkärit) 
8.6.1999 Technopolis 
18.6.1999 Biohit 
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22.6.1999 Perlos 
6.7.1999 Sanitec 
6.9.1999 TH Tiedonhallinta (Solteq) 
27.9.1999 SysOpen Digia 
28.9.1999 Tieto-X (Ixonos) 
8.10.1999 Liinos (Visma Software) 
15.10.1999 Proha 
22.10.1999 Aldata Solution 
5.11.1999 Data Fellows (F-Secure) 
9.12.1999 Comptel 
29.2.2000 BasWare 
15.3.2000 Satama Interactive (Trainer's House) 
10.4.2000 Saunalahti 
27.4.2000 Etteplan 
22.5.2000 Tekla 
22.5.2000 Wecan Electronics (Scanfil) 
29.5.2000 Iocore (Sentera) 
19.6.2000 Done Solutions 
29.6.2000 Biotie Therapies 
30.6.2000 Tecnomen 
3.7.2000 Okmetic 
14.12.2000 Vacon 
20.12.2000 SSH Communications Security 
8.3.2002 QPR Software 
14.10.2004 Kemira GrowHow 
18.4.2005 Neste Oil 
27.5.2005 AffectoGenimap 
13.3.2006 Salcomp 
14.3.2006 Ahlstrom 
13.4.2006 FIM Group Oyj2006 
10.10.2006 Outotec 
 
 
